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Cummings	and	Gove	cannot	reform	Whitehall	without
reforming	the	Treasury
Dave	Richards,	Diane	Coyle,	Martin	Smith,	and	Sam	Warner	explain	why	there	is	little	that	is	novel	in	Gove	and
Cummings’s	agenda	for	Whitehall	reform.	They	argue	that	reformers	would	do	well	to	consider	why	reform	has
been	discussed	for	over	50	years	but	has	yet	to	happen,	and	highlight	that	meaningful	change	will	require	Treasury
reform.
The	sage	advice	of	the	former	permanent	Secretary	Richard	Mottram	to	cabinet	ministers	is	to	resist	the	temptation
to	pronounce	that	the	UK	is	‘world-leading’	or	‘world-beating’	in	its	response	to	the	current	global	pandemic.	He
could,	of	course,	have	extended	this	wisdom	to	include	pronouncements	about	the	armed	forces,	judiciary,	policing,
health	service,	parliamentary	system	and	many	other	policy	areas.	Rarely,	in	an	era	of	evidence	based	policy-
making,	are	such	claims	empirically	sustainable;	and	they	partly	reflect	a	tendency	towards	British	exceptionalism.
Traditionally,	Whitehall	would	be	mentioned	in	similar	terms,	with	the	oft-invoked	aphorism	of	it	being	a	‘Rolls-Royce
like	machine’.	But	no	longer.	The	twin	challenges	presented	both	by	Brexit	and	the	unprecedented	demands	of
responding	to	COVID-19	have	seen	a	Conservative	Government	declare	a	‘hard	rain’	is	about	to	fall	on	the	civil
service.	This,	counter-intuitively,	from	a	party	whose	historical	ideological	mission	is	one	of	preserving	the	‘great
institutions	of	the	state’.
Whitehall	disharmony	and	calls	for	reform
Recent	months	have	revealed	a	series	of	very	public	tensions	across	Whitehall.	If	we	invoke	Hirschman’s	Exit,
Voice	and	Loyalty,	there	appears	to	be	little	evidence	of	the	latter	lurking	in	the	corridors	of	SW1	or	their	online
counterparts.	Conversely,	both	voice	and	exit	loom	large.	We	are	in	the	midst	of	a	series	of	high-profile,	often
rancorous,	departures:	the	alleged	sacking	of	Mark	Sedwill	as	Cabinet	Secretary;	Phillip	Putnam	from	the	Home
Office	(currently	suing	for	unfair	dismissal);	Richard	Heaton	from	the	Ministry	of	Justice;	and	Simon	MacDonald
being	asked	to	step	down	from	the	Foreign	Office	preceding	the	contentious	forthcoming	merger	with	the
International	Development	Office.
Following	his	blog	last	January,	Dominic	Cummings	has	been	portrayed	as	being	in	the	vanguard	of	a	cathartic
period	of	creative	destructionism	for	Whitehall.	Much	of	Cummings’s	critique	is	founded	on	a	view	that	the	dominant
Whitehall	model	that	emerged	from	the	Northcote-Trevelyan	reforms	is	no	longer	fit	for	purpose.	More	recently,
Michael	Gove,	the	Cabinet	Office	minster	with	responsibility	for	civil	service	reform,	sought	to	flesh	out	the
government’s	vision.	Invoking	Roosevelt’s	New	Deal,	his	calls	for	systemic,	bottom-up	reform	were	folded	into	a
wide-ranging	critique	of	Whitehall,	arguing	for:	dispersing	civil	servants	away	from	London;	preferencing	specialists
over	generalists;	importing	those	comfortable	with	new	digital	technologies;	policy-making	informed	by	data-driven,
complex	modelling;	an	end	to	the	merry-go-round	of	switching	roles	between	departments;	innovation	through
experimentation	and	risk-taking	requiring,	in	turn,	new	forms	of	accountability;	and	the	breaking	down	of
departmental	fiefdoms	and	silos.
Back	to	the	future
Gove’s	speech	had	undeniable	appeal	on	many	of	these	points.	Yet,	on	closer	inspection,	it	revealed	a	set	of
familiar	responses	to	perennial	challenges	faced	by	the	civil	service.	Those	who	have	taken	a	broad	brush,
historical	reading	of	the	speech	have	traced	the	lineage	of	its	ideas	to	the	Fulton	Report	of	1968.	Its	analysis	also
highlighted	overreliance	on	generalists,	a	lack	of	specialist	knowledge,	a	dearth	of	problem-solving	skills	and	the
need	for	a	renewed	focus	on	training	and	managerial	effectiveness.	All	remarkably	similar	to	contemporary
debates.	The	Thatcher	and	Major	governments,	too,	sought	to	shake	up	the	civil	service	through	introducing	a	more
‘hands	off’,	streamlined,	and	managerial	ethos,	even	if	fundamental	principles	remained	intact.
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More	recently,	the	picture	has	changed	little.	In	2004,	Tony	Blair	spoke	of	shifting	from	policy	advice	to	delivery	and
‘outcomes’.	He	referred	to	the	need	for	the	civil	service	to	become	‘more	entrepreneurial’	and	‘adventurous’	with
direct	reference	to	the	private	sector.	He	worried	about	‘inertia’	as	ministers	and	civil	servants	feared	the	process	of
accountability,	just	like	Gove.	The	language	of	strategic	leadership,	professional	and	specialist	skills,	innovation,
and	an	interchange	of	ideas	with	‘outsiders’	is	the	same.	Pre-dating	this,	in	2000,	the	Cabinet	Office	was	actively
advocating	training	for	‘generalists’	and	the	integration	of	specialist	skills	–	including	operational	research,	social
research,	economics	and	statistics	–	into	policymaking	and	monitoring.
Ten	years	later,	Gove’s	predecessor	as	Cabinet	Minister,	Francis	Maude,	advocated	a	‘smaller,	flatter,	faster’	civil
service,	‘focused	on	outcome	not	process,	more	digital,	more	unified,	more	accountable	for	delivery,	more	capable,
with	modern	terms	and	conditions,	better	managed	with	better	performance	management	and,	finally,	more	fun	to
work	for.’	Tackling	a	culture	that	was	‘overly	bureaucratic,	risk	averse,	hierarchical	and	focused	on	process	rather
than	outcomes’,	he	argued,	was	uncontroversial	and	enjoyed	cross-party	support.	So	far,	so	Gove-esque.
But,	despite	the	supposed	radicalism	of	Maude’s	speech,	he	acknowledged	to	the	Public	Administration	Committee
that	he	found	‘no	fundamental	problem’	with	the	civil	service.	Both	he	and	the	Cabinet	Office	favoured
‘incrementalism’	as	the	vehicle	for	reform,	not	the	‘radicalism’	favoured	by	the	committee.	And	so,	Maude’s	2012
Civil	Service	Reform	Plan,	despite	its	focus	on	‘better	skills,	better	technology	and	a	mindset	that	revolves	around
the	user,	not	the	producer’,	progressed	slowly.	The	Cabinet	Office’s	report	‘One	Year	On’	points	to	familiar
obstacles	to	reform	associated	with	big	organisations	and	sits	well	with	the	then	Cabinet	Secretary,	Sir	Jeremy
Heywood’s	assessment	that	the	process	would	take	between	five	and	ten	years.	Will	Gove	and	Cummings	wait	so
long?	A	key	issue,	then,	as	noted	by	the	Institute	for	Government	back	in	2012,	is	less	about	identifying	the
challenges,	but	rather	maintaining	the	political	will	to	see	reform	through.
One	of	Gove’s	most	intuitively	persuasive	(and	unoriginal)	arguments	–	the	need	for	an	emphasis	on	‘hard,
testable,	data’	and	the	measurement	of	‘outcomes’	–	illustrates	the	point	well.	Major	reforms	directed	at	this	very
issue	are	underway.	But,	as	part	of	our	current	research	into	the	role	of	the	Treasury,	one	former	senior	civil	servant
told	us:	‘…while	measuring	outputs	is	hard,	measuring	outcomes	is	really	really	hard.’	As	recently	as	December
2018,	the	Permanent	Secretary	at	the	Cabinet	Office	and	the	Director	General	of	Public	Spending	at	the	Treasury
argued	that	Single	Departmental	Plans	and	the	new	–	or	rather,	born-again	–		Public	Value	Framework,	with	its
focus	on	outcomes	and	evidence	of	‘public	value’	beyond	the	raw	numbers	alone,	was	designed	to	improve
deficiencies	in	this	area.	However,	change	and	innovation	was	slow	as	(re)building	the	experience	of	the	civil
service	and	embedding	‘functional’	oversight	of	cross-cutting	issues	could	not	be	achieved	overnight.	A	recent
National	Audit	Office	report	confirms	that	building	(and	retaining)	a	specialist	workforce	is	no	easy	task.
Meaningful	reform	requires	taking	on	the	Treasury
A	crucial	piece	of	the	jigsaw	that	appears	to	be	missing	from	the	Gove/Cummings	vision	is	that	of	Treasury	reform.
Wider	arguments	for	a	more	devolved,	bottom-up	approach,	consistently	rub-up	against	the	fact	that	macro-
economic	policy	requires	some	form	of	centralised	control.	As	one	former	senior	cabinet	minister	eloquently	put	it	to
us:	‘…the	Treasury	is	the	Ego	of	the	national	psyche	and	there	is	no	nice	reform	that	gets	us	round	this.’	If	real
reform	is	to	be	realised	and	a	meaningful	break	from	the	traditions	[and	pathologies]	of	the	Whitehall	model
provided,	then	an	alternative	to	the	powerful,	centralising,	controlling	force	the	Treasury	holds	over	the	rest	of
Whitehall	is	needed.	But	here,	Gove’s	critique	is	somewhat	limited	in	ambition:
At	the	heart	of	our	programme	must	be	a	focus	on	what	works	–	what	actually	helps	our	fellow	citizens	to
flourish.	And	that	means,	as	I	have	emphasised,	rigorous	evaluation	of	Government	programmes.	What	value
do	they	add?	What	incentives	do	they	provide	for	better	performance	and	better	service	to	others?	The
Treasury	in	the	UK	has	been,	historically,	very	good	at	questioning	the	cost	of	projects,	but	not	their	broader
social	value.	
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One	aspect	of	this	is	the	government’s	confirmed	review	of	the	Green	Book	rules	on	investment	programmes	as
part	of	its	levelling	up	agenda.	However,	meaningful	Whitehall	reform	is	conterminously	linked	to	the	need	for	real
fiscal	devolution.	Yet	as	the	Kerslake	Report	noted:	‘…the	UK	system	of	spending	control	remains	one	of	the	most
highly	centralised	in	developed	countries.’	As	highlighted	above,	there	is	an	established	pattern	of	different
governments	rhetorically	appealing	to	the	need	for	greater	devolution,	but	then	baulking	at	the	potential	power	give-
away	this	might	involve.	The	Treasury	has	been	as	guilty	as	any	in	all	of	this.	This,	then,	has	led	to	an	approach
that	sustains	a	key	element	of	the	Whitehall	model,	that	of	central	control	to	the	detriment	of	a	more	pluralised,
responsive,	and	devolved	model	of	governance.
In	a	climate	of	uncertainty,	the	fear	is	that	a	set	of	re-centring	tendencies	have	developed,	with	the	Treasury
continuing	to	seek	to	exert	control	over	the	fiefdoms	it	surveys.	It	is	hard	to	imagine	a	reforming	zeal	can	be
sustained,	when	confronted	by	this	dynamic	within	the	civil	service	machine.	If,	therefore,	there	is	little	that	is	novel
to	be	found	in	Gove	and	Cummings’s	agenda,	today’s	reformers	might	do	well	to	focus	on	why	talk	of	reform	has
been	continuous	for	over	50	years.
___________
Note:	the	above	piece	draws	on	research	for	the	Public	Expenditure	Planning	and	Control	in	Complex	Times
project,	funded	by	The	Nuffield	Foundation.
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